



Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Williams, John (2015) 'Democracy and regulating autonomous weapons : biting the bullet while missing the
point?', Global policy., 6 (3). pp. 179-189.
Further information on publisher's website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12203
Publisher's copyright statement:
This is the accepted version of the following article: Williams, J. (2015), Democracy and Regulating Autonomous
Weapons: Biting the Bullet while Missing the Point?. Global Policy, 6(3): 179-189, which has been published in ﬁnal
form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12203. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in
accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
Democracy and regulating autonomous weapons: biting the 
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This is the pre-peer-reviewed version of the following article: John Williams (2015), 
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Point?’ Global Policy ?? (?): ??-?? which has been published in final form at www.???? 
Abstract 
This paper argues that current public policy debate around the regulation of emerging 
autonomous weapons systems is vital, yet also in danger of neglecting crucial challenges. 
Current analysis focuses around efforts to define autonomy and to incorporate 
‘autonomous’ systems within established regulatory systems, particularly international law 
and arms control treaties and conventions. This leads to an emphasis on two key decision 
moments as the focus of regulation: the initiation of hostilities and target engagement, 
reflecting the just war tradition that provides the intellectual backdrop for much of this 
debate. The paper suggests this underestimates the significance of the potential 
consequences of such weapons systems, arguing that this consensus disguises the extent to 
which autonomy can only be meaningfully engaged within the specific context of the 
circumstances when such systems may be deployed, and that the speed of decision-making 
by such systems will outstrip regulatory endeavours focused on the two decision moments. 
The paper thus argues that only wide-ranging debate, especially within democracies leading 
the development of such systems, about the relationship of autonomous systems to the 
nature and purpose of military violence and underpinning democratic values and principles, 
can adequately address the full extent and significance the challenge presented by the 
emergence of contextually autonomous weapons.  
Author 
John Williams is Professor of International Relations in Durham University’s School of 
Government and International Affairs. He is also a member of the Durham Global Security 
Institute. His research focuses on normative elements of international relations theory, 
especially the English school, and on contemporary aspects of the just war tradition. 
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Democracy and regulating autonomous weapons: biting the 
bullet whilst missing the point? 
 
The emergence of weapons systems capable of a growing range of functions independent of 
human control is a source of significant debate, especially within democratic societies. At 
present, democracies leading the development of such technology, principally the US and 
UK, affirm their policy is not to deploy systems without human involvement in, or 
monitoring of, command and control decisions, especially around target engagement (HRW, 
2012, pp. 7-8). However, public policy debate about regulation of ‘autonomous’ weapons is 
significant and the source of substantial public concern (e.g. ICRAC, 2009, 2014; HRW, 2012). 
Some fear present assurances about continued human oversight will be incrementally 
eroded to the point where oversight is, effectively, impossible or meaningless (e.g. Heyns, 
2013, p. 6; HRW, 2012, p. 20). Whether governments of other states interested in acquiring 
such systems will exercise the same rigorous control as the US and UK is also potentially 
troubling. Addressing the challenges of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) is a 
bullet that must be bitten and a responsibility the leading democracies must accept. 
Development of increasingly technologically advanced weaponry, up to and including 
artificially intelligent systems, could dramatically alter conduct of military operations, 
changing strategic, operational and tactical thinking and the way in which democratic states 
engage with the role of military force in politics.  
As already apparent with extensive use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs – or drones in 
common parlance), which have extended their role from intelligence, reconnaissance and 
surveillance into strikes against a range of targets, public policy concerns are real and 
significant. As unmanned ground vehicles are increasingly weaponized and the capabilities 
of next generation UMS become clear, there is a real possibility of the use of weapons 
systems that undertake an increasing range of functions, including target identification and 
engagement, with limited human oversight or possibly without any human involvement (e.g. 
DOD, 2011). Existing systems with this capability are restricted to specific roles and 
environments – anti-ballistic missile systems such as Patriot and Iron Dome; short-range ship 
protection systems such as Phalanx; counter rocket, artillery and mortar (C-RAM) systems; 
and SGR-1 ‘guard robots’ deployed by South Korea in the DMZ between itself and North 
Korea1 – yet those restricted, defensive roles are unlikely to persist. 
Regulating new military technology is always challenging, but the argument here is that 
autonomous UMS pose particular challenges as yet insufficiently addressed in public policy 
debate, especially as their capabilities increase and their capacity for autonomous decision-
making is extended. Present regulatory debate focuses on the potential impact of 
autonomous weapon systems at two key decision points: the initiation of hostilities, where 
there are concerns that autonomous systems may take people to war inadvertently; and the 
moment of engaging human targets, where there are concerns about maintaining 
discrimination and proportionality. These two decision points reflect deep-rooted thinking 
and practice in regulating military violence, yet, I argue, autonomous weapon systems 
potentially render those key decision points inappropriate as the prime focus for regulatory 
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policy and practice. Democratic public policy debates needs to be extended to engage 
seriously the extent to which autonomous weapons systems have a role to play in military 
violence consistent with the values that characterise democracies and how regulatory policy 
and practice must develop to retain the realistic possibility of exercising effective control 
over the deployment of autonomous systems.  
I elaborate this argument in four main steps. Firstly, I consider regulatory consequences of 
the problem of defining ‘autonomy’, showing how variable definitions reflect assumptions 
about the two key decision points of initiating hostilities and engaging targets. Secondly, I 
look at why initiation of hostilities and target engagement are the two central regulatory 
moments, arguing this reflects the structure of the dominant ethical discourse surrounding 
war: the just war tradition. Thirdly, I consider perspectives derived from science and 
engineering which begin to broaden debate. Finally, I look at how the complex interaction of 
these different perspectives is shaping debate and how consensus around initiation of 
hostilities and target engagement may miss the point about the public policy significance of 
emergent LAWS.  
Autonomy 
Do we already live with autonomous weapons systems? For some, the answer is, ‘Yes – and 
we have done for quite some time.’ I have identified existing systems (Patriot, Phalanx, C-
RAM and their ilk) that seem to fulfil the US Department of Defense (DOD, 2012, p. 13) 
criterion of ‘autonomy’: ‘once activated, [they] can select and engage targets without 
further intervention by a human operator.’ In contrast, the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD, 
2011, para 206), sets the bar for autonomy very high: ‘autonomous systems will, in effect, be 
self-aware and their response to inputs indistinguishable from, even superior to, that of a 
manned [system]. As such, they must be capable of achieving the same level of situational 
awareness as a human.’ These systems could be given a set of mission parameters and be 
expected to decide the best tactics to deploy to fulfil that mission, set appropriate levels of 
force and targeting for those tactics, and assess when mission parameters had been fulfilled 
and action should cease (MOD, 2011, paras 205-206). Anything short of human-level 
situation awareness is ‘automation’.  
‘Detect, identify, engage and destroy an incoming ballistic missile within this defined spatial 
volume’ is a very different mission from ‘cooperate with friendly human forces to identify 
and suppress armed insurgents sheltering amongst a civilian population within this city 
block, exercising utmost care to avoid civilian casualties and capturing insurgents alive 
whenever possible.’ A system capable of the former would count as autonomous for the 
DOD, but not the MOD, which would require something close to fulfilment of the latter. But 
are these efforts at absolute definition useful and appropriate? Appeals for a ban, or at least 
a moratorium, on the development of autonomous UMS are not uncommon, with the UN 
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Execution; Human Rights Watch 
(HRW); and the International Committee on Robot Arms Control (ICRAC), amongst others, 
calling for such steps (Heyns, 2013; HRW, 2012; ICRAC, 2009, 2014). 
The focus of these calls is systems which meet the DOD definition: ‘weapons that could 
select and engage targets without human intervention’ (HRW, 2012, p. 1); ‘systems that, 
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once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human 
operator.’ (Heyns, 2013, pp. 7-8). The lack of human oversight (‘out of the loop’) systems, or 
systems where human oversight (‘on the loop’) is minimal or ineffective (HRW, 2012, p. 2) is 
central to these concerns, especially because of the increased operational speed of such 
systems (HRW, 2012, pp. 9-12). This highlights how target engagement as a critical decision 
point is embedded in definitional debates about autonomy. ‘Meaningful human control’ at 
the moment of target selection is a common point at issue in this debate: with all three of 
those terms contestable for some (e.g. Sharkey, 2014).  
However, discussion excludes systems like Phalanx, Iron Dome and C-RAM, which are seen 
as ‘automatic’ (e.g. HRW, 2012, pp. 12-13). The basis for distinguishing between ‘automatic’ 
and ‘autonomous’ seemingly rests on two factors. Firstly, the complexity of the environment 
within which the systems operate: shooting down incoming ordnance is contrasted with 
more complex missions (HRW, 2012, pp. 12-20). Heyns (2013, p. 8) suggests a contrast 
between ‘structured and predictable’ and ‘open’ environments, although without clarity on 
where the line between those two is drawn. Secondly, the nature of the target matters: 
ordnance, not people. ‘[T]hey present less danger to civilians because they are stationary 
and defensive weapons that are designed to destroy munitions, not launch offensive 
attacks.’(HRW, 2012, p. 12). More extensive discussions of this distinction, and others, such 
as ‘human supervised autonomous weapons’ and ‘sense and react to military objects’ 
(SARMO) systems (e.g. Sharkey, 2014), highlight how context and circumstance are engaged 
in debates about the definition of autonomy. That inevitably impinges on the account of 
acceptable levels of human control: the computers may have more license when targeting 
incoming munitions on the high seas, less if targeting munitions in an urban environment or 
if they are targeting people.  
This suggests Anderson and Waxman (2013) are correct: autonomy is a matter of degree and 
context. It will be approached incrementally, with systems that presently perform certain 
functions autonomously under certain conditions acquiring additional capabilities. In some 
environments those capabilities will be sufficient that human monitoring of operations is all 
that is necessary. In others, direct human control over will be needed because of the 
complexity of the mission or environment or both. Differentiating between the automation 
of operational capabilities and the acquisition of autonomy over decision-making is not clear 
cut without reference to context, including the type of target that is engaged and the 
moment of engagement. Further complicating this definitional issue is the nature and extent 
of human control necessary for it to be ‘meaningful’. That not only relates to the context and 
circumstances of deployment and engagement, but also to philosophical and psychological 
issues (e.g. Sharkey, 2014).  
Concerns over the potential of autonomous systems to make initiation of hostilities either 
more likely or even automatic also play an important role in debates over the significance of 
autonomy. Critics claim they will lower the threshold of war (usefully summarised in 
Altmann, 2013, p. 140). Furthermore, a new arms race may ensue as increasing numbers of 
states seek to deploy more and better autonomous systems (e.g. Altmann, 2013), 
reinforcing increased propensity for war. Sparrow (2009a, pp. 26-27) offers a vision of large 
numbers of armed UMS on near-permanent stand-by just beyond the borders of potentially 
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hostile states, shadowed just inside those borders by other LAWS waiting to pounce, 
drastically raising the risk of war by mistake or non-human decision. Micro- or nano-scale 
systems, with individually harmless autonomous components ‘swarming’ at the point of 
attack to create devastating weapons, is a further instance of this sort of future potential 
(for wider discussion see Dunn, 2013). The ‘dehumanizing’ effect of autonomous weapons 
and the temptations of greatly reduced casualties amongst the armed forces of states 
deploying such systems reinforce concerns that autonomous war will be seen as easy, quick 
and clean (e.g. HRW, 2012, pp. 39-41). There are reasons to be sceptical about these claims. 
Propensity for war is vastly more complex than technological innovation (e.g. Vasquez, 
1993). Launching war does not come down to the basis of ‘because we can and because 
technology means we will win’. Regulating, even banning, LAWS is unlikely to have a decisive 
effect on the war-proneness of world politics. 
Recognition of the significance of context and circumstance are crucial to framing effective 
regulation. ‘Contextual autonomy’ highlights that this is not an abstract assessment. This 
approach parallels Thomas Hellström’s (2013, p. 101) concept of ‘autonomous power’: ‘… 
the amount and level of actions, interactions and decisions an agent is capable of 
performing on its own.’ Hellström’s account fits this sense of autonomy as a spectrum, with 
the level of significance of autonomy conditioned by the context within which any system 
operates. Hellström goes on (2013, pp. 102-5) to plot existing systems and common fictional 
examples using degree of autonomous power and level of lethality to establish the point 
where some degree of moral responsibility may be assigned to LAWS.  
The adequacy and appropriateness of regulatory systems to address the consequences of 
incrementally increasing levels of automation that phase into autonomy are important 
questions. ‘Contextual autonomy’ is, therefore, the appropriate concept, as it recognises 
that formulation of the problem is not static, and the meaning of autonomy and levels of 
autonomy weapons systems may possess alter in different contexts. ‘Contextual autonomy’ 
requires extension of Hellström’s (2013, p. 101) definition: ‘ the amount and level of actions, 
interactions and decisions an agent is capable of performing on its own’, with: ‘within a 
definable operational context such that the outcome of operations are materially affected 
by the system’s independent actions, interactions and decisions without routine directive 
intervention by another, human, agent.’ That is complex, clumsy and contestable, but such is 
the nature of definition within problems of this sort. 
This brief discussion of debates about ‘autonomy’ as the crucial characteristic of these 
emerging weapons systems suggests two conclusions. First, regulatory systems need to be 
sufficiently flexible to accommodate autonomy’s contextual and circumstantial framing. A 
fixed category of ‘LAWS’ subject to special rules or restrictions, or even an outright ban, is 
unlikely to be attainable, because autonomy is not a characteristic that can be judged in a 
way that makes a distinct category persuasive. Autonomy is contextual, unlike, for instance, 
characteristics that distinguish chemical, biological or blinding laser weapons that deploy 
specific and definable means to create lethal effect. The challenges of establishing arms 
control for autonomous systems are therefore distinct from and greater than those in these 
areas. Second, current debate reflects the two classic decision points of ethical and 
regulatory debate about weapons systems: the moment of the initiation of hostilities and 
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the moment of target engagement. These two problems are connected: seeing autonomy as 
threatening easier, or even automatic, initiation of war; and weakened or removed human 
control over who is targeted and how; threatens the basis of established ethical enquiry and 
regulatory policy and practice. The fear is of autonomous weapons that remove human 
control over war and central to this is fear that their speed of action will far outstrip human 
ability to control, or even to monitor and regulate, future weapons.  
What this leaves undiscussed is why initiation of hostilities and target engagement are the 
crucial regulatory moments and whether or not there may be alternatives that better enable 
effective engagement with the challenges and threats contextually autonomous systems 
present. I argue this reflects deep-rooted ethical debates about the use of military force, 
embedded in the just war tradition, and how these are reflected in regulatory policy and 
practice. The next section summarises how the interaction between military technology and 
just war thinking underpins concerns about LAWS, before moving on to look at how 
alternatives may be constructed.  
Ethics, public policy and autonomous UMS 
At the heart of the matter for some critics of LAWS is a fundamental moral claim that human 
beings must not be subject to lethal force by non-human weapons systems (e.g. ICRAC, 
2009; Altmann et al, 2013, p. 73). Only people may exercise such authority on the basis of a 
natural, not an artificial, intelligence. No matter how fast, comprehensive and accurate the 
data-processing capability of computers may be there is something basically morally wrong 
about handing such authority to a machine. This ‘de-humanization’ not only risks making 
war more likely, it also challenges the central moral questions war raises about when and 
why acts of systematic and organised large-scale violence are justifiable, who may be 
attacked as part of that activity, and how much force might be used. This is the territory of 
the just war tradition.  
The just war tradition has, from a position of substantial neglect, become the dominant form 
of ethical discourse about war (Walzer, 2006; Rengger, 2013). It is disparate, hence my 
preference for ‘tradition’ over ‘theory’, but there are unifying features of the various types 
of theorising reflected in the debate about LAWS. Most important is the structure of ethical 
judgement into two (or, increasingly frequent in contemporary debates, three) linked but 
distinctive categories. Jus ad bellum provides a focus for ethical assessment of the initiation 
of war; jus in bello addresses the conduct of military operations, especially the engagement 
of targets; and, the relative newcomer, jus post bellum is concerned with the circumstances 
that enable a just ending to a war. These three points of ethical focus overlap and 
interconnect, for instance via concerns that war fought unjustly may make a just peace more 
difficult (Orend, 2000), but remain distinguishable. Initiating war is assessed against a 
distinctive set of criteria in comparison with its conduct; with the former focused around 
questions of ‘just cause’, ‘legitimate authority’, ‘right intention’, ‘proportionality’ (of war as a 
response), ‘last resort’, and ‘reasonable prospects of success’; conduct is assessed against 
‘discrimination’ and ‘proportionality’ (of violence used to achieve a specific objective).  
There are two principal approaches to applying this just war framework. The edges between 
them are blurred, but they are worth elaborating as they begin to highlight how and why 
6 
 
ethical debate about autonomous UMS is so complex, with seemingly contradictory claims 
made about their ethical implications. This in turn explains the depth of the challenge facing 
public policy. In addition, it reveals why initiation of hostilities and target engagement are 
dominant as the key moments of judgement, and why this may be problematic.  
First is an approach, increasingly prominent in the last twenty years, that brings the just war 
tradition into accord with the liberal analytical philosophy that underpins most 
contemporary human rights discourse. This is a wide-ranging movement addressing jus ad 
bellum, jus in bello and jus post bellum (for leading general examples of this move see e.g. 
Orend, 2000; Rodin, 2002; McMahan, 2005). Here, crudely speaking, ethical principles can 
be identified through the rigorous application of philosophical logic, working from a set of 
carefully stated and grounded first principles – such as the idea of human beings as rights-
holders, amongst which the right to life is especially important – in order to better 
understand complex ethical choices. The use of carefully constructed ‘thought experiments’ 
enable ethicists to control the variables under consideration to better understand how very 
important ethical principles ought to be resolved when they come into conflict with one 
another, such that basic ethical insights can be applied to the hard-to-control world of 
military operations.  
The right to life is clearly central, with substantial debate as to how that right, at the 
individual level, may relate to a state’s right to self-defence as a just cause for initiation of 
war (e.g. Rodin, 2002). Further, killing in combat poses profound ethical challenges, as 
justifiably killing an individual is typically seen as exceptionally demanding, with many right-
based theorists rejecting membership of a class of ‘combatant’ as sufficient, requiring a 
higher standard of specific individual liability to lethal force as a result of actions or, possibly, 
intentions (e.g. May, 2005). Questions of when we can go to war and when we can kill which 
people are dominant, helping to explain why the initiation of hostilities and target 
engagement are critical moments of judgement: they are moments when the most 
fundamental rights are most at stake. Technological mediation of both decisions is a long-
standing reality, but technological determination of either or both is what is at stake as 
automaticity phases into autonomy and humans move from being ‘in’ to ‘on’ the loop, and, 
perhaps, to being ‘out’ of it entirely. Can this be rendered consistent with the protection of 
rights? Belief that this is not possible is central to the position of many critics and advocates 
of a ban, such as Human Rights Watch (HRW, 2012). 
Second, is the idea of just war as a tradition of thinking that seeks to provide a set of 
questions that we must ask about the resort to, conduct and settlement of war. This sees 
ethics as a situated activity, deploying techniques of case-based reasoning (often known as 
casuistry, reflecting the origins of the just war tradition in medieval and early-modern 
Catholic theology) and hermeneutics in order to reach balanced, reasoned judgements 
about the complex specifics of real-world cases. The phenomenology of war is important 
here, too, reflecting on the experiences and perceptions of those engaged in military 
operations. An ethos of ‘practical wisdom’, as opposed to the philosophical precision of the 
analytical approach, characterises this account of just war (e.g. Johnson, 2007; Rengger, 
2013). The same criteria for conflict initiation and target engagement are applied, but 
understood differently, as contextual assessment is important.  
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Timing, though, remains crucial: jus ad bellum criteria such as ‘last resort’ make it necessary 
to consider whether, in the circumstances, there are other options still available that might 
offer effective redress; right intention asks whether actors are committed to the long haul to 
bring about a more just situation in the aftermath of conflict. The ‘legitimate authority’ 
condition frames debate about who holds the right to make critical decisions, and on what 
basis. Within conflict, the jus in bello criteria of discrimination asks about the legitimacy of a 
target in specific circumstances, with the liability of people to lethal force being shaped by 
the military situation – for instance concern that killing uniformed soldiers of the Iraqi army 
as they retreated from Kuwait towards Basra in 1991 amounted to (unjustifiable) ‘slaughter’ 
(Burke, 2007, p. 205). The ethical justifiability of when hostilities are initiated and their 
conduct, understood in the context of the time, cannot be determined a priori, even if 
philosophical tools can help us in our reasoning. Such an approach, I argue, is more useful to 
better engaging with the wider implications of LAWS, because it broadens the ethical 
agenda away from initiating hostilities and target engagement to ask about the context of 
the conflict itself and the values and standards of those who fight them, which provide 
important behavioural cues and restrictions on permissible behaviour.  
These differences matter, and not just to philosophers, because they have the potential to 
establish different types of public policy debates that push towards rather different 
regulatory structures. Acceptance of analytical philosophy as a basis for regulation is likely to 
reinforce incorporating LAWS into a human rights-based legal regime. Rights-based 
regulatory structures have many significant benefits, because they help to preserve the 
central focus on human beings as the ultimate referent object of ethical discourse, 
addressing a key concern of critics about the de-humanising effect of their use (e.g. HRW, 
2012). Analytical philosophy is more suited to the promulgation of rules, including rules 
about processes to be followed when, inevitably, rules conflict with one another.  
Any effort to summarise international legal debate over LAWS in this paper would inevitably 
be futile, but the centrality of human rights to the analytical approach to just war theorizing 
is reflected in much legal debate. Schmitt (2013), for example, sees few problems with 
LAWS, arguing current International Humanitarian Law (IHL) can accommodate such systems 
with little, if any, substantial modification. The US DOD (2012, pp. 3, 7, 11, 12) repeatedly 
identifies compliance with IHL as a design requirement of any future systems, alongside 
‘appropriate human involvement’. 
Casuistic approaches, by contrast, are more likely to support regulatory structures 
emphasising the need for contextual judgement about the appropriateness of using LAWS 
when set against a broader set of political and ethical objectives, including the nature of the 
conflict in which their deployment is considered. Rights may well be a primary element of 
these objectives, but thinking of this sort is more open to balancing rights-based claims 
against objectives that are harder to express in terms of rights because they appeal to 
ethical concepts or reference points that are not reducible to individual rights. Instances 
may include communal well-being and the value attached to shared beliefs, culture or 
values. UMS may offend against such values, for instance conceptions of military service that 
emphasise values such as honour, courage and self-sacrifice.2 They may assist wider 
communal values such as the obligation to privilege the protection of a shared way of life 
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and sense of national identity and belonging in the face of existential threat. Importantly, 
assessing and understanding LAWS is best served by on-going critical reflection on real-
world instances. A priori judgement is always contingent.  
Current armed UAVs effectively illustrate debates that deploy these distinctive approaches 
and relate to technologies that are a precursor to LAWS. For example, adopting an analytical 
stance, Strawser (2010) sees a moral duty to deploy UAVs where this reduces the risk to 
combatants, as long as there is no loss in capability to observe principles of discrimination 
and proportionality. The technology is a means to an end, and, if the technology produces 
better outcomes it should be deployed. Schmitt (2013) extends this to autonomous systems, 
as does Arkin (2009), a prominent advocate of the detached and impartial decision-making 
capability of autonomous UMS.  
Coeckelbergh (2013, pp. 94-6), appeals to more phenomenological ethical reasoning to 
highlight how current UAVs may be reversing the dehumanising tendencies of technology 
and distance in war. The extent of surveillance, the quality of the sensory arrays and the 
immediacy of the experience reported by drone pilots may be restoring the individuality of 
those targeted. This is something UAV operators also stress – that their experience of long-
term surveillance of some of their targets restores an intimacy to combat unavailable from 
the cockpit of an aircraft or the inside of an armoured vehicle (e.g. Wittes, 2014; Otto and 
Webber, 2013). This contradicts claims about detached and impersonal ‘video game 
warfare’ (HRW, 2012, p. 40).  
Those ‘benefits’ would be compromised were systems to become increasingly autonomous 
such that the ‘human in the loop’ provides only final authorisation for a strike carried out 
following autonomous surveillance, assessment and target selection by LAWS. ‘On the loop’ 
systems would further degrade that quality of engagement. Empathy, compassion and 
inherent reluctance to harm other humans would be lost, but so too would the possibility of 
vengeful or racist decision-making. Context matters and the values and principles that can, 
or should, underpin public policy and military behaviour are not always consistent with one 
another.  
The complexity of the debate over the role that machines may play in life and death 
decisions is partially revealed. At what point does the human being lose control over the 
decision to go to war or the process of taking a life? What degree of technological mediation 
is possible before that loss occurs? Does it necessarily matter, if the machines can make 
‘better’ decisions in terms of conserving human lives and respecting human rights? Sharkey 
(2014) reflects some of these challenges with promulgation of a five-stage spectrum of 
human control, suggesting that only stages one and two manifest ‘meaningful’ control. As 
with debates over autonomy conducted in the abstract, however, this leaves unaddressed 
the issues of context and circumstance that more casuistic approaches to ethics consider. Is 
the loss of human control, perhaps temporarily, a price worth paying if it offers decisive 
military advantage in a conflict where defeat would result in a triumph for a genocidal 
dictatorship? That construction consciously echoes Walzer’s (2006: 251-269) controversial 
notion of ‘supreme emergency’, whereby the abandonment of discrimination and 
proportionality in war may be, in extremis, permissible, or at least excusable. For this version 
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of just war thinking, there are ethical dilemmas in war, and ethical dilemmas are as acute in 
the field of war as they are in any other field where life and death decisions occur, such as 
medicine. Judgements about legitimately deploying violence inevitably involve 
compromising other values focused around peace and the preservation of human life. 
A resolution of the ethicality of autonomous UMS on the level of the fundamental moral 
permissibility of ceding some level of control over life and death to technology is 
unavailable, especially when ceding such decisions may enable the lives of some to be saved, 
by removing them from the dangers of combat, for instance, or permit the deployment of 
systems that could retrieve casualties under intense fire. UAVs already achieve the former, 
stimulating debate over whether the manifest force protection benefits they offer come at 
unacceptable costs of reduced discrimination between combatants and civilians – 
themselves complex, contested and contextual categories (e.g. Strawser, 2010; Plaw, 2013). 
Those debates also connect to the wider context of the justifiability of war in general and 
particular wars. For example, McMahan (2005) argues that without the just cause of self-
defence, all deaths in war are ethically impermissible, radically challenging the standard just 
war consensus, and legal position, that soldiers who kill other soldiers in combat are not 
normally liable for those deaths.  
Complexity is no reason to abandon the philosophical debate. Persistent lack of resolution 
reinforces the need for continuing enquiry to better understand the different arguments 
made and to relate these to technological, political, social and military developments. Public 
policy should be honest about the complexity of the issues contextually autonomous UMS 
present. 
The policy implications of this complexity are significant. Firstly, it reinforces the sense that 
binary positions, whether in favour of or against LAWS, are problematic and offer a poor 
basis for policy-making. Secondly, it suggests the need to look beyond the initiation of 
hostilities and target engagement as the focus of debate. These two moments are deeply 
embedded in the just war tradition but they are also the moments at which the challenges 
posed by LAWS are at their most intensive, both in terms of intellectual complexity and, 
consequently, in terms of the unlikelihood of decision-makers (whether human or not) 
making the most consistently justifiable choices.  
UMS and engineering. 
Regulating UMS through the way in which they are designed overlaps, but extends, legal and 
ethical debates. For example, the legality of UMS is often considered in terms of compliance, 
or otherwise, with rules on ‘means of warfare’. The MOD (2011, para. 502) notes: ‘Most of 
the legal issues surrounding the use of existing and planned systems are well understood 
and are simply a variation of those associated with manned systems.’ Article 36 of the 1977 
First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions requires all new means of warfare to 
undergo technical assessment to ensure systems can fulfil the requirement for 
discrimination (HRW, 2012, pp. 21-26). As Anderson and Waxman (2013, p. 19) note, it is far 
easier to design, build and deploy autonomous systems that do not comply with that 
requirement than to produce ones that do. Prodigious technical challenges in designing fully 
autonomous systems capable of distinguishing between human beings fulfilling the roles of 
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combatant and non-combatant, especially in complex operational environments, mean legal 
prohibitions on indiscriminate weapons may be effective regulatory bulwarks against 
autonomous systems for many years (e.g. MOD, 2011, para 508), as long as those 
developing such systems accept the law. Anderson and Waxman (2013, pp. 19-20, 23-26) 
and Garcia (2014) suggest the US, as the technological leader in this field, scrupulously 
observes these requirements and works with allies to embed as deeply as possible legal and 
behavioural principles and norms, to establish obstacles to states or non-state groups that 
may see advantages in indiscriminate LAWS.  
Weapons that cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury are illegal under Article 35 
(2) of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (e.g. Anderson and Waxman, 
2013, p. 10). Deployment of existing autonomous systems is eased in this respect because 
they target weapons, rather than humans, in the form of missiles or other ordnance. 
Advocates of future LAWS highlight their role in disarming enemy combatants, targeting 
weapons rather than people: ‘Our dream machine would confront an enemy combatant on 
the battlefield; physically remove the rifle from his hands; saw the rifle in half with a 
diamond tipped saw; hand the two-halves back to him; and then tell him to, “Have a nice 
day!”’ (Canning, 2009, pp. 13-14) That level of discrimination is, indeed, a ‘dream’: plausible 
battlespace reality will not approach such a vision. It is, however, illustrative of the focus on 
target engagement as a critical issue: by avoiding engaging humans, and instead engaging 
weapons, legal and ethical obstacles fall away.  
How far engineers can or should restrict activity to preclude developing unethical or illegal 
weapons is not exhausted by the law. For some (e.g. Arkin, 2009; Canning 2009) the 
challenge is largely around understanding IHL demands and incorporating these into the 
programming of LAWS such that targeting decisions will be legal. For others (e.g. Kovac, 
2013), the problems are profound, with almost all weapons-related research being 
necessarily ethically problematic, if not prohibited, because it may result in the death of 
innocent civilians. Sparrow (2009b) argues engineers have a special responsibility to develop 
systems that are safe for human beings to work alongside. That requirement is more far-
reaching than may appear at first glance, helping demonstrate how focusing on initiation of 
hostilities and target engagement may be challenged. 
Sparrow (2009b, pp. 171-176) suggests issues that extend beyond the technical challenges of 
designing and building LAWS that are at least as safe to work with as existing manned 
systems and that can interact with manned systems in a way that is no more dangerous, and 
ideally less dangerous, than present systems. In some instances, such as bomb disposal, that 
may point strongly in favour of developing LAWS. Keeping humans out of harm’s way links 
these technical issues to a common ethical principle of harm reduction, summarised by the 
Latin tag primum non nocere3 associated with the Hippocratic Oath, but prominent in many 
statements of ethical conduct in scientific research (e.g. Royal Society, 2005).  
Harm, however, is a very complex concept (for discussion with relevance to international 
politics see e.g. Linklater, 2011) and one that extends in time and space. Sparrow (2009b, pp. 
174-175) picks up on some of these issues, for instance the psychological damage to UAV 
operators because of their radical distancing from the battlefield with resultant limits to 
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their ability to intervene in distressing events, including the deaths of both civilians and 
comrades (also Gregory, 2011, pp. 197-199; Otto and Bryant, 2013). Other potential harms 
may arise from mistakes that can only be addressed by deploying humans into previously 
unanticipated situations; or over-confidence in the ability of LAWS to achieve objectives 
that, in reality, require human deployment. Finally, more complex and costly systems mean 
human beings may be placed in harm’s way to recover broken or damaged equipment 
(Sparrow, 2009b, pp. 172-174). Consequently, current statements of the harm principle in 
this context (e.g. Hellström, 2013, p. 106) lack sufficient specificity in terms of the ‘harm’ 
that should be prevented, how harm ought to be understood and how the inevitable 
dilemmas that arise in terms of balancing different harms in complex political circumstances 
can be resolved, or their debilitating effects mitigated.  
The ethics of potentially harmful technology and the moral responsibility of scientists is a 
long-standing debate that produces conflicting answers, even if it were possible to agree on 
the basic set of ethical tools that ought to be deployed, given the different time-frames in 
play and the potential degrees of separation between scientific and engineering research 
and development, and the harmful uses for eventual products (for an interesting discussion 
of the general ethical responsibility of scientists and engineers see Koepsell, 2010). This 
highlights that incremental development of autonomy and the differentiated way in which 
LAWS are likely to comply with ethical and legal strictures within different environments 
poses serious engineering challenges. An autonomous weapon system deployed on the 
warship of a sovereign state targeting incoming anti-ship missiles on the high seas subject to 
continuous human monitoring is, clearly, a different proposition from the ‘killer robot’ (e.g. 
Garcia, 2014), targeting insurgents within a densely populated urban environment in pursuit 
of a pre-defined mission of broad parameters and without oversight. The engineering that 
enables the former to be a present reality will play a part in the process that could, perhaps, 
eventually see the latter deployed. Yet the path from one to the other is so lengthy, 
complex, expensive and unpredictable that knowing where and when a ‘red line’ may be 
crossed in the science and engineering of such systems requires the wisdom of Solomon.  
Law and ethics cannot establish clear principles which engineers and scientists can apply to 
their research in order to know whether it is legal and ethical, now or in the future, without 
their active engagement in reflection and debate (Koepsell 2010). The responsibility of 
judgement cannot be evaded by passing it to others, seeing legal compliance as a software 
engineering challenge. Professional codes of conduct and the ethical standards embodied in 
representative professional bodies, such as the UK Royal Society (2005), acknowledge and 
institutionalise this two-way process. Situated judgements against broad principles, and 
recognition of the reality of dilemmas, hard choices and wicked problems characterise this 
arena, and cannot be wished away.  
This problem is not solely confined to expressly military research. The MOD (2011: para. 
625) notes how engineering issues are not confined to explicitly military technology: ‘[N]ew 
developments in military systems are … likely to come from specialised development of 
commercial systems, rather than vice versa. It is to the commercial sector that we must look 
for the delivery of future disruptive technology.’ This casts the net of engineering ethics very 
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wide indeed, and the response to these concerns is similarly wide-ranging. Ineke Malsch 
(2013), for example, aims to use just war categories and concepts to structure governance of 
scientific research.  
This brief summary scratches the surface of the applicability of broad ethical debates to the 
science and engineering associated with development and deployment of LAWS. It helps 
explain the attractiveness of following the focus of just war theory and IHL on initiating 
hostilities and target engagement. The potential for LAWS to lower the threshold of war, or 
even to initiate hostilities automatically; and their potential to transform the nature of 
combat in ways that further reduce the value of human life is real and serious.  
The accelerated speed that is characteristic of contemporary technological innovation 
reinforces the sense of concern that surrounds these two crucial decision points. Systems 
like Phalanx and Patriot ‘think’ faster than human beings – indeed they have to if they are to 
fulfil their role. Slowing the systems down so that humans can keep up defeats the object 
and flies in the face of centuries of military practice where increased speed confers strategic 
and tactical advantage. Stopping the machines from taking us to war and stopping them 
from killing people and destroying property at the moment when those decisions are taken 
will become impossible. The broader questions that come out of science and engineering 
ethics contribute alternative foci for policy debate, by asking questions prior to those that 
arise at the initiation of hostilities and the engagement of targets. Which missions are 
appropriate for LAWS? How far ought autonomy to extend within those missions? How 
should democratic accountability be maintained over the initiation of war and its conduct, if 
those processes LAWS? Should democracies accept strategic and tactical limitations in their 
use of LAWS in order to preserve democratic values of accountability and engagement? Are 
present international arrangements, like the UN Conventional Weapons Convention (CWC), 
appropriate for pursuing international agreement on effective regulation?  
Regulating UMS: challenges and opportunities 
Effective regulation is in the interests of all involved in the development, deployment and 
governance of these systems. The importance of this work increases as system capabilities 
increase and proliferation accelerates. Nobody, it seems, disputes the need for effective 
action in this arena – it is a bullet that must be bitten. The dominant regulatory debates 
reflect just war thinking, aspects of national and international law around weapons systems 
and armed conflicts, and the professional environment within science and engineering. All 
three interact and are, in some important ways, mutually reinforcing, contributing to the 
present consensus that conflict initiation and target engagement are the key foci.  
However, consensus becomes problematic if important issues lie beyond its purview or are 
unjustifiably downplayed. Mutual interaction and reinforcement to establish a strong 
consensus risks creating blind-spots. My concern in relation to UMS, especially as the pace 
and extent of autonomy increase, is that such blind-spots are being created through over-
emphasising initiating hostilities and target engagement. Regulatory structures exist that 
focus on different temporal points: Article 36 points to one such instance, with its focus on 
the potential of deployed weapon systems to comply with the requirements of 
discrimination and proportionality, as does the Article 35 (2) requirement not to develop 
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weapons that cause unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury. All of the load-bearing 
terms involved – discrimination, proportionality, unnecessary and superfluous injury – are 
dynamic, contextually specific and demand debate. Yet they point towards the potential to 
reconsider the temporal perspective of regulatory debate. This is apparent in the advocacy 
by some (e.g. ICRAC, 2009; Wallach and Allen, 2013; Altmann, 2013) of arms control as a 
means of banning or restricting the types and capabilities of LAWS that will be developed, 
controlling their numbers and establishing monitoring and verification protocols. Whether 
that be including them within existing treaties, such as those on chemical and biological 
weapons which include delivery vehicles; reviving moribund mechanisms, such as the 
Conventional Forces in Europe treaty with its numerical and geographical caps on 
deployments; or developing new treaty arrangements, whether functional, geographical or a 
mixture of the two; advocates suggest initiating this activity now could build a long-term 
regulatory framework.  
The model for such systems – Cold War arms control – has appeal, given its ability, over 
years of patient and often frustrating or seemingly fruitless negotiation, to build a complex 
system of limits to weapons systems, numbers and deployments that contributed to 
containing tension and preserving stability in the face of ideological and geopolitical 
hostility. However, the analogy is only partial (e.g. Altmann, 2013) and the challenge of 
effective verification in particular is enormous, given the dual-use nature of not just the 
technology but the systems themselves. A nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missile 
has only one purpose (deterrence). Autonomous UMS may well have many potential uses, 
including several that would be regarded as beneficial (casualty retrieval from combat zones, 
for instance).  
The democratic political culture and the professional standards and values of scientists, 
engineers, lawyers and service personnel therefore emerge as additional regulatory foci. 
Rather than concentrating, as in the present consensus, on the moments of initiating 
hostilities and engaging human targets, there is an opportunity to extend regulatory 
approaches into these arenas, and to connect them up in presently underdeveloped ways.  
The technological potential of LAWS must be judged in relation to debates about the kinds 
of conflicts it is ethically and legally appropriate to conduct and the types of systems and 
tactics democratic states are prepared to countenance. Arms control is an important 
subsequent manifestation of those debates, but cannot be divorced from them. The values 
and standards democratic societies espouse and seek to defend and promote manifest in 
how they configure their military capabilities and deploy those capabilities in specific 
operations. They also manifest in the values and standards their armed forces inculcate 
amongst their members. For example, this has taken place in democratic states’ increasing 
expectations that armed forces are capable contributors to humanitarian missions, having a 
role in fulfilling an international ‘responsibility to protect’. They are also about professional 
cultures and the internalisation of behavioural norms, including rejecting technologically 
deterministic tropes that any and all advantages must be adopted. These are not static 
debates, set against ethical and legal criteria, or treaty provision, fixed in their present 
constellations. As the casuistic approach to just war emphasises, they are applied, 
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contextual and practical judgements informed by principle, but aware of the need for 
flexibility in the face of the unpredictable and subject to continuous critical assessment of 
past experience to inform present practice and future planning. 
Policy conclusions 
Autonomous UMS raise technical and legal issues affecting current standards and practice 
around initiating hostilities and engaging targets. Policy-makers must respond to the NGO-
led challenge in these areas, accepting and pursuing calls for compliance with the highest 
existing legal standards in development and deployment. That also requires developing 
workable definitions of ‘automaticity’ and ‘autonomy’ that retain sufficient flexibility to 
permit appropriate technological innovations enabling safer, more discriminate and more 
proportionate weapons systems. 
Arms control, for example via the UNCWC, is a further valuable course to pursue. 
Overcoming its limitations – encompassing non-state actors and developing effective and 
timely verification mechanisms in particular – is a key challenge. It took more than twenty 
years from the first use of nuclear weapons to the first major arms control treaties, a time-
frame that, on many current estimates, could see the deployment of fully autonomous UMS. 
Political leadership is necessary to shift the established consensus. This demands sustained 
and serious debate over if and how technologies of automation and autonomy contribute to 
the protection and promotion of core democratic values, for example: human rights, dignity 
and equality; accountability; shared identity; popular sovereignty; national self-
determination; and citizen participation. Those values do not always coincide and military 
violence challenges them all in important, even fundamental, ways. The incremental 
incorporation of contextually autonomous systems into the arsenals of democracies is 
underway, but there is, as yet, insufficient consideration of how they may affect the ethical 
principles involved in the democratic endorsement of the permissibility, on occasion, of 
systematic and organised violence by the state. That agenda ranges wider than conflict 
initiation and target engagement, yet it is one that has not, yet, been entered into on a 
sufficient scale. The just war tradition and the ethics of science and engineering in society 
provide vital resources for addressing questions within arenas of democratic culture and 
professional standards and values about when and why wars may be fought, to what ends 
and deploying which means. That may, in time, produce powerful cultural prohibitions 
against LAWS, likely to prove at least as effective as legal prohibition (e.g. Tannenwald, 
2007) as the incompatibility of LAWS with democratic values are tested, debated and 
internalised in professional and public cultures. Or it may set contextually flexible and case-
specific boundaries around LAWS that inform technical and legal analysis, grounding such 
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1 SGR-1 robots are not, presently, set to operate fully automatically, engaging targets they have 
detected without human authorisation. Such capability does exist, however. 
2 Illustrative here is controversy over the proposed Distinguished Warfare Medal, to be awarded to 
drone pilots and cyber operators. This met such sustained criticism, including that it denigrated 
traditional military virtues of self-sacrifice and courage in the face of the enemy, that it had to be 
withdrawn (Londoño, 2013). 
3 ‘First’ (or, sometimes, ‘above all’) ‘do no harm’. 
